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Japan-North Korea Relations Since the North-South Summit:  
Stuck in an Ever Deepening and Divisive Rut 
 
Christopher W. Hughes 
 
Japan-North Korea relations have slipped into an ever deepening and divisive rut 
since the North-South summit of 2000, with little prospect of significant improvement 
in the near term. Japan has both intentionally and unintentionally constructed around 
itself a framework of international and domestic policy constraints that impede its 
ability to engage North Korea both bilaterally and trilaterally via US-South Korea-
Japan co-ordination efforts. In particular, as the US and South Korea contemplate 
renewed engagement efforts with the North, Japan’s ability to follow its trilateral 
partners is hamstrung by domestic pressure on the abductions issue. The consequence 
could be that Japan will find itself as the most reluctant and least able of the trilateral 
partners to engage the North. In turn, this could mean that it is unable to provide 
crucial background support for international engagement efforts, and even undermine 
overall US and South Korea strategy. Meanwhile, the incapacitation of Japan’s 
diplomatic policy has had the effect of strengthening Japanese military containment 
efforts towards the North.  
 
Prospects for US-South Korea-Japan strategy towards North Korea 
 
Diplomatic deadlock? 
2001-2002, yet again, have not been vintage years for Japan-North Korea relations. 
Japan-North Korea bilateral normalisation talks suspended in October 2000 (only 
reinitiated in April of the same year after a near eight-year gap following their original 
suspension in November 1992) failed to restart in 2001 and there is no immediate sign 
that this situation will change in 2002. The diplomatic deadlock was reinforced by 
increased bilateral tensions over financial scandals associated with the North Korean 
community resident in Japan from late 2001 onwards; the sinking of a suspected 
North Korean ‘spy ship’ (fushinsen) by a Japan Coast Guard (JCG) vessel on 22-23 
December 2001; and continued suspicions over the alleged abductions by the North of 
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Japanese citizens, known in Japanese as racchi jiken. The problematic nature of 
Japan-North Korea relations was further highlighted by the incident in which five 
North Koreans failed to obtain asylum in the Japanese consulate in Shenyang, China, 
in May 2002; and by Japan’s decision to salvage the wreck of the North Korean spy 
ship from China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in June and July of the same year. 
The fact that the Japan-North Korea normalisation process is now close to surpassing 
in length that for Japan-South Korea relations (the former requiring so far eleven 
years, and the latter twelve years in total), and that bilateral relations have moved ever 
more into the negative, has been broadly reflective of, and, indeed, inter-linked with, 
the general stagnation in US and South Korea bilateral engagement efforts towards 
the North throughout much of 2001-2002. The impasse in the relations of these two 
states with North Korea has been demonstrated most vividly with the armed clash 
between North and South Korean patrol boats in the Yellow Sea on 29 June 2002. 
This resulted in the harsh domestic criticism of President Kim Dae Jung’s ‘Sunshine 
Policy’ within South Korea, and the US announcement that it would postpone a 
scheduled visit to Pyongyang by James Kelly, US Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs. 
 
However, since early 2002 other signs of change have appeared in North Korea’s 
respective bilateral relations with the US, South Korea and Japan, which, although 
both positive and negative in nature, may offer some prospect of eventually moving 
forward the rapprochement process on the Korean Peninsula. US-North Korea 
relations have clearly undergone a general deterioration due to President George W. 
Bush’s identification of North Korea in the State of the Union Address in January 
2002 as constituting part of the ‘axis of evil’, and by implication as a potential target 
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of the extension of the ‘war on terrorism’.1 Moreover, the Bush administration’s 
generally harder line towards North Korea and insistence on specific reciprocity in 
any future negotiations—evidenced first by what might be seen with some 
justification by the North as a near perfidious attempt to attach additional conditions 
concerning reductions in its conventional weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) before the US was willing to fulfil its original obligations under 
the Agreed Framework (AF) of 1994, and most recently in March 2002 with the 
administration’s refusal to ‘certify’ that the North had complied with the AF’s 
provisions to freeze its nuclear programme, then followed by its issuing of waivers to 
allow the continuation of fuel oil supplies, but all serving as a warning of US 
intentions—could function to further frustrate the North’s overall strategy of seeking 
improved ties with the US, back it into a corner, and generate new military 
brinkmanship employing its remaining, if declining, conventional and missile assets. 
The North’s declaration that its self-imposed moratorium on missile tests may cease 
in 2003, in tandem with the determination of sections of the Bush administration to 
reinterpret the AF as obligating the North to begin immediate cooperation with 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of its nuclear facilities, 
could lead to new missile and nuclear crises. 
 
Diplomatic movement? 
Nevertheless, although US-North Korea relations have worsened in both rhetorical 
and substantial terms, there may also be some opportunities for progress in bilateral 
relations. The Bush administration’s labelling of North Korea as part of an ‘axis of 
evil’ was clearly in part for domestic consumption and an exercise in making up the 
necessary threesome of numbers. Renewed and major military instability on the 
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Korean Peninsula is clearly not an option for US policy-makers mindful as they are of 
China’s effective veto over any military intimidation of the North, that the US 
military requires North Korea to provide threats and not wars to legitimise its position 
in the Asia-Pacific, and that the limits to US power globally and regionally are rapidly 
reappearing as the conflict in Afghanistan drags on. Hence, the US’s declared 
willingness to hold substantial talks ‘anywhere, any time’ (beyond informal talks 
carrying on at the UN) with North Korea might yet be realised.2 The Bush 
administration having conducted the mandatory, if somewhat confused and 
unnecessary (not to say destructive in adding to the factors undermining President 
Kim Dae Jung’s ‘Sunshine Policy’) review of policy will, all too predictably, return to 
the essential conclusion of its predecessor and the Perry Report of September 1999 
that engagement is the optimum means to deal with the North Korean security 
problem. It may even be the case that the hiatus imposed on US-North Korea 
relations, the relatively ‘plain-talking’ line of the Bush administration, the US’s call 
for specific reciprocity (something that US policy-makers are being myopic in 
seeking anew as they already have it to a degree in the AF, but are highly unlikely to 
receive more of until they fulfil their own obligations, and would be better off 
converting into a recognition of the benefits of a more diffuse reciprocity), and 
whatever hybrid ‘Clinton administration-engagement policy with Bush-style 
characteristics’ that emerges, may actually be easier to stomach domestically for the 
US Congress, and thus empower Bush to offer more in subsequent negotiations. North 
Korea, for its part, despite its usual bellicose rhetoric and genuine annoyance at the 
US abandonment of diplomatic niceties in describing the regime in Pyongyang, and 
although it has regained some confidence following the apparent shock of its 
inclusion in the ‘axis of evil’ and now understands US intentions more clearly, is also 
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likely to try to respond to US offers of negotiations within the parameters of the 
limited concessions that it is likely to be offered and the creaking restraints of its 
reform dilemma-ridden domestic political economy.    
 
The possibility of renewed and hopefully constructive dialogue on the Korean 
Peninsula has been indicated recently also with North Korea’s response to Kim Dae 
Jung’s last gasp attempts to get the Sunshine Policy (hamstrung since early 2001 by 
US passivity in backing the South’s approaches to the North and being willing to push 
its own relations with the North in step with the South; as well as by Kim Dae Jung’s 
own failure to address his domestic critics at an earlier stage) back on track before the 
end of his presidency. The visit of special presidential envoy Lim Dong Won to 
Pyongyang at the start of April 2002 secured the first inter-governmental contacts for 
five months, and North Korean promises to resume family reunions, economic co-
operation talks, and to accept the visit of a US envoy. Although these promising 
developments have subsequently been set back by the June 2002 patrol boat clash and 
the heightened domestic criticism of Kim Dae Jung’s engagement policy.  
 
 
Japan and North Korea 
These faltering movements in US and South Korean bilateral relations with North 
Korea have also been matched by mixed developments in Japan-North Korea 
relations. In mid-March 2002, Hiramatsu Kenji, Director of the Northeast Asia 
Division of the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held secret talks with his North 
Korean counterparts in Beijing to request information on an additional racchi jiken 
incident involving Arimoto Keiko and recently featured prominently in the Japanese 
 5
media.3 In early April, Japan and North Korea also scheduled in Singapore the first 
inter-ministerial contacts since July 2000, when Sakaguchi Chikara, the Japanese 
minister of Health, Labour and Welfare, was due to discuss Japanese assistance for 
North Korean casualties of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Atomic Bombings. 
Moreover, repeatedly throughout late March and early April, Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichirō stated the government of Japan’s position that it too was willing to hold 
talks with the North at any time if it met certain conditions. Japan-North Korea 
relations were again set back by the North’s cancellation of the inter-ministerial talks 
in April. However, the North, clearly frustrated by its lack of progress in relations 
with the US and looking to create more diplomatic leeway by returning to talks with 
Japan, agreed in bilateral Red Cross negotiations to resume the search for ‘missing 
persons’ (yukue fumei in Japanese, and a compromise term for racch jiken). North 
Korean foreign ministry officials indicated in May that they might be willing to 
resume normalisation talks with Japan. The North’s government also appeared to be 
behind the announcement in early July by four former members of the Japan Red 
Army (JRA), given sanctuary in Pyongyang since their hijacking of a Japanese 
airliner in 1970, that they were willing to return to Japan—a clear sign that the North 
was looking to conciliate Japan, as well as attempting to secure its removal from the 
US’s list of states sponsoring terrorism, which has formed one major obstacle to 
improved ties with both states.4
 
Hence, as of mid-2002, and despite the interruption occasioned by the June patrol 
boat clash, it appears that US, South Korean and Japanese overall policy is edging 
back towards renewed, if fitful and limited, bilateral dialogue with North Korea. The 
Trilateral Co-ordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) which adjusts these three sets 
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of bilateral relations with the North amongst the US and its South Korean and 
Japanese allies is also functioning more smoothly. The TCOG meeting in Tokyo on 
April 9 welcomed the progress in North-South relations following Lim’s visit to 
Pyongyang. Coming in the wake of the patrol boat incident, the next TCOG meeting 
in Washington on 8 July was more circumspect about engagement with the North, but 
nevertheless the Japanese and South Korean representatives came with message of 
urging the US to consider renewed dialogue with the North. Despite the relatively 
enhanced degree of willingness of the involved parties to resume dialogue, it is clear 
that the future course of the North Korean security problem remains uncertain. US-
North Korea dialogue if it restarts in earnest may founder on the issues of ballistic 
missiles and WMD, and the failure of this dialogue will probably impact on the 
North’s willingness to continue dialogue with the South. Kim Dae Jung, already a 
lame duck president in the final months of his administration, will be anxious to move 
dialogue forward and actualise the promised visit of Kim Jong Il to Seoul in order to 
ensure his historical legacy and to influence the future course of North-South 
relations. These efforts, though, will only succeed if the US provides less passive 
backing for engagement policies and the domestic critics of engagement can be won 
over. Consequently, the Korean Peninsula security situation remains fragile and can 
oscillate between conflict and conciliation scenarios in line with US and South Korea 
actions.  
 
Japan’s as facilitator or obstacle? 
Just as importantly, and possibly crucially, renewed attempts to ensure stability on the 
Korean Peninsula through engagement with North Korea are likely to depend on the 
degree to which Japan is willing to seek dialogue with the North, and the related 
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degree to which it can extend assistance to the US and South in their respective 
efforts, and thereby maintain the co-ordinated trilateral approach to North Korea. For 
in spite of the recent signs that Japan is willing to engage the North, at the same time 
most of the indications are that the negative aspects continue to the positive aspects in 
Japan-North Korea bilateral relations and that this may form a continued and 
important drag on wider trilateral engagement efforts. Hence, Japan may have made 
contact renewed diplomatic contacts with North Korea since March 2002, but this was 
to discuss the overwhelmingly negative issue of the racchi jiken. Similarly, Koizumi 
urged North Korea to engage in talks with Japan throughout April of the same year, 
but this was constantly prefaced with the remarks that the necessary condition for the 
talks was that the North should be forthcoming on dealing with the issue of 
abductions. 
 
Following the outline above of recent developments in Korean Peninsula security, and 
given the fact that Japan may actually be emerging again as the most reluctant (and 
indeed, as will be demonstrated later on, least able) of the TCOG partners to move 
forward with dialogue, the remainder of this paper is devoted to considering what is 
likely to be the impact of Japan’s position on the future of North-South reconciliation 
and Japan’s own diplomatic and security policy. In the past it is clear that Japan has 
been seen as a key, if more of a background and support, player in Korean Peninsula 
security affairs. Japan’s principal role has been to provide economic assistance for the 
stabilisation of North Korea in the form of funding for the Korean Energy 
Development Organisation (KEDO) and food aid, and also to provide bases under the 
bilateral US-Japan security treaty for US power projection capabilities on the Korean 
Peninsula—a role further augmented with the revision of the Guidelines for US-Japan 
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security co-operation from 1997 onwards. Hence, the important question now facing 
US and South Korean policy-makers is the degree to which Japan can be relied upon 
to play both these engagement and containment support roles in co-ordination with its 
TCOG partners.  
 
In order to answer these questions, the article first investigates Japanese diplomatic, 
economic and military policy towards North Korea within the context of US and 
South Korean strategy and evaluates what common policy lessons have been drawn 
from the experience of the three states and the degree to which Japan can be expected 
to adhere to these in the present and future; and, in turn, how divergent Japanese 
behaviour could pose certain destabilising risks for any trilateral approach to 
establishing stability on the Korean Peninsula. Based on this investigation, this article 
concludes that Japan has increasingly become an obstructive and possibly divisive 
factor in trilateral co-operation. More specifically, this is due to the fact that Japanese 
policy-makers have constructed around themselves, both intentionally and 
unintentionally, a structure of international and domestic constraints that make it hard 
for Japan to break out of is passivity in dealing with North Korea. The outcome of this 
is that on the one hand, Japan has been unable to exert significant influence on the US 
to avoid unwanted conflict scenarios on the Korean Peninsula, but on the other has 
been unable to provide significant support for the US and South Korea for its own 
preferred policy option of engagement with the North. All in all, then, Japanese 
diplomatic and economic strategy towards the Korean Peninsula has suffered from 
heavy inertia, and become essentially ‘strategy-less’. Instead the only area of Japanese 
policy which has seen and will continue to see movement in the future is its military 
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response to North Korea through enhanced co-operation with the US and the build-up 
of its own independent military capabilities. 
 
US, South Korea and Japan strategy towards North Korea  
 
US and South Korea policy lessons 
Arguably, policy-makers from the US and South Korea have derived a number of key 
policy lessons from the recent history of the North Korean security problem, and 
particularly in the period from the nuclear crisis of 1994 through to the end of the 
Clinton administration, many of which found voice in the eventual compilation of the 
Perry Report.5 As noted above, the Bush administration has taken pains to distance 
itself from Clinton administration policy, but it is likely that over the medium to 
longer term, and even taking into account differences of emphasis, many of the 
principles of the Perry Report in their broadest sense will continue to inform US and 
South Korean policy.  
 
The first of these principles is the need for a mixed balance of containment and 
engagement.6 This is demonstrated by Clinton and Bush administration efforts to 
ensure that North Korea should be deterred from further military brinkmanship 
through the upgrading of the capabilities of US and South Korean forces, as well as 
the upgrading of the political and military operability of the US-Japan alliance.7 At 
the same time, though, the need for engagement to complement containment, 
particularly in the diplomatic and economic spheres has also been recognised. The 
KEDO project, extension of food aid, and efforts to spur on North-South economic 
co-operation are all examples of such forms of engagement which were initiated prior 
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to and which have been maintained (even with some difficulty) since the advent of the 
Bush administration.  
 
The second principle has been that there is a need for mutually reinforcing levels of 
containment and engagement. Hence, US, South Korea and Japanese policies to deal 
with the North Korean security problems have sought to function on the level of 
bilateral normalisation negotiations; the level of trilateral co-ordination via the TCOG 
to co-ordinate bilateral links; and the fuller multilateral level through involving North 
Korea in bodies such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since 2000, and South 
Korean efforts to encourage EU member states (so far done in a uncoordinated 
fashion that derides any ambitions of a Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP]) 
to normalise relations with the North as a measure of reassurance for its status in the 
international community.  
 
The third principle has been to practice the above two principles with a combined 
sense of long-termism, magnanimity, and implacability. Although possibly forgotten 
by the Bush administration in its early stages, the lesson learned by the Clinton 
administration in its latter stages and by the Kim Dae Jung administration from the 
very start, was that the regional powers could not follow a policy of coaxing North 
Korea out of its international isolation and increasing its interdependency with the 
outside world unless it was first accepted that the North had the legitimate right to 
exist as a sovereign state; that it was unlikely to collapse internally; and that a long-
term strategic vision was necessary based on the realisation that plans should be made 
in regard to the North as it is, rather than as policy-makers might hope it should be. In 
addition, it also became clear that whilst taking a tough line, it was also possible to 
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provide the North with concessions based on cool-headed judgement as to whether the 
North was prepared to reciprocate in a direct or diffuse fashion, and that the least 
successful policy would be one which allowed the North to goad any one of TCOG 
states into an action that would allow the North to trade one off against another. 
 
Finally, the fourth policy lesson derived was the position of Japan as forming the 
keystone for the platform for US and South Korean policies towards North Korea. In 
terms of containment, as already noted, Japan’s position is key in providing bases for 
US power projection, as well as holding in reserve certain economic sanctions. In 
terms of engagement, Japan has always been envisaged as providing major slices of 
funding and expertise for KEDO, food aid, and for the economic reform and 
reconstruction of North Korea.   
 
The first three policy lessons would appear to be largely generic to both the Clinton 
and Bush administrations, even if the modality and timing of how they are 
instrumentalised may display some differences. The fourth policy lesson that Japan is 
the central supporting plank of US and South Korean containment and engagement 
policies towards the North also, arguably, remains unchanged. Indeed, the Bush 
administration’s ‘Japan-handlers’ have clearly envisaged before and since taking 
office that Japan should certainly play an enhanced role in shaping trilateral 
containment and engagement policy towards North Korean policy8, and Kim Dae 
Jung has worked hard to try to keep Japan on board engagement efforts in the face of 
various hardships outlined below both prior to and after the North-South summit. 
Following this outline of general policy principles, the paper now moves on to 
examine Japan-North Korea bilateral relations within the context of trilateral US-
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South Korea-Japan strategy, the factors that have shaped Japan’s own policy, and to 
examine to what degree Japan has managed to conform and diverge from its TCOG 
partners. By doing so, it will be possible to reveal the extent to which Japan is actually 
becoming an impediment to resuming efforts to stabilise the Korean Peninsula since 
2002.  
 
Japan’s policy towards North Korea  
The official government position since 1998 has been that it pursues a policy of 
‘deterrence’ and ‘dialogue’ towards North Korea, and although the government has 
been keen to emphasise that it retains control over bilateral relations with North 
Korea, it has also been careful to stress that this two-pronged approach is largely in 
conformity with the containment and engagement policies of the US and South.  
 
There can certainly be no doubt that Japanese policy-makers, consisting in this case of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and certain elements of the governing 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), have been conscious of the need to engage North 
Korea since the end of the Cold War, if not since the period of East-West détente in 
the mid-1970s. Japan’s policy-makers have been prepared to experiment with 
dialogue with North Korea and looked to achieve the normalisation of diplomatic 
relations for a variety of not necessarily mutually exclusive motivations, including: 
the desire to contribute to the overall stability of Northeast Asia and promote the 
reunification of the Korean Peninsula; to counter the threat of WMD and ballistic 
missile proliferation; to clear up the legacy of colonial history; and to promote 
bilateral economic relations and secure access to personal financial benefits for 
certain key political figures.9 Japan’s optimum and long-term strategy, and the one 
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generally accepted by the most influential policy-makers, for dealing with North 
Korea, therefore, has been one of engagement. 
 
Japan’s first opportunity for full engagement with North Korea came with the end of 
the Cold War and the start of bilateral normalisation negotiations in 1991. The 
progress (or lack of it) of these negotiations, leading to their suspension in 1992, is 
detailed elsewhere.10 Here, however, it is suffice to point out that MOFA agreed to 
initiate the talks on the basis that there would no preconditions and all subjects would 
be subject to discussion. In turn, after the talks actually started there emerged a 
number of sources of contention, including: North Korea’s demands for an apology 
and compensation for the periods of Japanese colonial and wartime rule in Korea; 
Japan’s demand that the North should allow the visits to Japan of Japanese-born 
spouses of North Korean citizens (known as Japanese wives, or Nihonjinzuma); that 
North Korea should accede to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demands 
to open its nuclear facilities to inspection; and, most importantly for recent 
developments in Japan-North Korea relations, that the North should provide 
reassurances about the safety of a Japanese citizen alleged to have been abducted to 
North Korea and implicated in the bombing of a South Korean airliner in 1987—the 
first of the racchi jiken to emerge as a crucial bilateral problem.11  
 
These bilateral problems on their own were sufficient to lead to the suspension of 
normalisation talks—the North walking out of the talks in 1992 in protest at Japan’s 
insistent raising of the racchi jiken and implicit accusation that it was involved in 
state-sponsored kidnappings. However, a further brake on the progress of bilateral 
normalisation talks was placed by Japan’s reassurances to South Korea from 1990-91 
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onwards that it would only pursue negotiations with the North in reference to 
concomitant progress in North-South dialogue. This policy of linkage or renkei was 
non-binding in an official sense, but was the start of tying MOFA into a Japan-South 
Korea concert in dealing with North Korea, and also to form one side of the trilateral 
framework of US-South Korea-Japan trilateral co-ordination mentioned earlier. The 
other sides of the trilateral framework itself were given shape by increased US-Japan, 
US-South Korea, Japan-South Korea bilateral summit meetings and consultations on 
the North Korean nuclear issue. Then, following the passing of the nuclear crisis and 
initiation of the Agreed Framework and KEDO, the trilateral framework was given 
more formal and regularised shape.  
 
The effect of Japan’s increasing de facto submission of its bilateral diplomatic policy 
to developments in North-South relations, and trilateral co-ordination amongst the 
US, South Korea and Japan, has been to both open up and constrict its channels for 
engagement with North Korea. In one sense, Japan’s co-operation with the other two 
powers has legitimised its more direct involvement in Korean Peninsula security 
affairs. But in other ways, it has limited its room for diplomatic manoeuvre by 
handing an effective veto to South Korea over normalisation efforts based on the 
renkei policy, which, is also itself subsequently contingent in practice upon progress 
in US-North relations. Japan has thus imposed a near international ‘double-lock’ on 
its diplomacy towards North Korea which comes at the bottom of the pile. The 
practical outcome of this situation for Japan has been that it has been obliged to 
synchronise attempts to restart normalisation talks with North Korea in step with 
improvements in North-South and US-North Korea relations. Thus in 1997 the 
Japanese government only felt able to make efforts to restart normalisation talks 
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following the start of the Four Party Peace talks, leading to an agreement between the 
governments for Japan to provide food aid, and that the North would allow the visits 
of Nihonjinzuma, and under the compromise formula of referring to them as ‘missing 
persons’ (yukue fumei) investigate the alleged abduction incidents. 
 
Japan’s adherence to international restrictions on its diplomatic policy towards North 
Korea can be criticised on the grounds that it has simultaneously restricted its ability 
to deploy economic power in order to address in a more active fashion the root 
economic causes of North Korea’s insecurity, and pushed it towards a more passive 
stance.12 But in the mid-1990s Japan’s policy can at least have been said to been 
consistent and to have been co-ordinated with those of the US and South Korea, and 
thus have worked to engage North Korea in frameworks such as KEDO and fulfil 
most of the general policy principles outlined in the previous section.  
 
However, from late 1998 onwards Japan’s policy towards North Korea entered into a 
phase of becoming ‘strategy-less’, which meant that it even threatened not to support 
the established basis of US-South Korea-Japan co-operation. Japan’s reaction to the 
provocation of the North Korean test of its ‘Taepodong-1 missile’ in August 1998 was 
to impose limited sanctions on the North and to consider delaying the signing of the 
agreements to fund KEDO; and this was in spite of the fact that in the October 1998 
Joint Declaration between Japan and North Korea it stated that KEDO was the most 
realistic framework for dealing with the North’s WMD.13 Japan’s tougher stance 
towards North Korea in this period was also increasingly influenced by the inability 
of both sides to reach an agreement on the racchi jiken: the North angering the 
Japanese government with its report in June 1998 that it could find no trace of any 
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missing persons. As a result, throughout the period from mid-1998 to mid-1999 there 
was generated intense anti-North Korean feeling, bordering on hysteria, in sections of 
the general public and fuelled by mass media sensationalism. For instance, the Tokyo 
bookshops were filled with volumes proclaiming North Korea’s potential guerrilla 
attack on Japanese nuclear power facilities and other aggressive behaviour, and the 
press circulated rumours of another missile test in the summer of 1999.14
 
The flipside to Japan’s refusal to conduct dialogue with North Korea in this period 
was an emphasis on the deterrent aspects of its security policy towards the North. The 
Japanese government, in response to the Taepodong-1 launch, announced its decision 
in August 1999 to conduct joint technological research with the US into a Ballistic 
Missile Defence (BMD) system and to launch four intelligence satellites.15 Japan also 
first indicated its willingness to challenge the incursions of North Korean fushinsen by 
instructing the SDF to pursue two ships out of its territorial waters in March 1999. In 
April and May 1999 (not entirely coincidentally with the fushinsen incident), the 
Japanese government was able to ensure the passage of the Guidelines legislation 
through the Diet.  
  
Japan was eventually brought back into line with the continuing engagement element 
of US and South Korean policy by the time of the APEC meeting in September 1999 
and in the run up to the announcement of the Perry Report. In part, this was due to the 
fact that the Japanese government felt it had made sufficient protests to warn North 
Korea of the seriousness of its intentions and that it felt it demands over missile and 
the racchi jiken were to be built into the Perry Report and subsequent trilateral 
strategy.16 But Japan’s response was also in part the result of gentle US and South 
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Korean persuasion. However, even as Japan moved back into line with US and South 
Korean policy this created new difficulties for it in maintaining trilateral coopearation. 
The Japanese government certainly welcomed the North-South summit of June 2000 
as contributing to the stability of the Korean Peninsula. But Japan then became 
somewhat apprehensive at the loosening of international restrictions and rapid pace of 
US-North Korea rapprochement later in the year as it seemed possible that the US 
might move ahead and normalise relations with the North, so forcing Japan to quicken 
the pace of its own bilateral negotiations before it felt it had the necessary domestic 
consensus in place to provide concessions to the North. In particular, the Japanese 
government was concerned that it might be obliged to move in concert with its 
trilateral partners and be placed at a disadvantageous position in negotiations, or, 
much more likely, that domestic opposition in Japan would simply mean that it was 
unable to keep pace with US and South Korean engagement towards the North and so 
endanger the unified trilateral approach. 
 
However, even though Japan did move back into line, the pattern of its behaviour 
from 1998 to 1999 was a portent of the types of problems that its bilateral diplomacy 
and role in trilateral cooperation towards North Korea has experienced in 2001-2002 
and may continue to experience beyond 2002. For it is clear that the Japanese 
government has locked itself into a set of international and domestic diplomatic 
restrictions that will make it progressively harder for its to exert an independent or 
even constructive influence on the efforts to stabilise the Korean Peninsula. On the 
one hand, the policy of renkei means that it is either relatively subordinate to, but also 
overly passive, in following US and South Korean initiatives towards North Korea 
and cannot restrain the US from either intimidating behaviour towards the North or 
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from moving too fast with improvements in diplomatic ties that threaten to leave 
Japan behind and to ‘bounce’ it into making concessions on normalisation with the 
North. Moreover, if Japan breaks from this renkei policy, then this only serves to have 
a divisive influence on trilateral cooperaton as Japan has no alternative and 
authoritative vision of North Korea policy in place of that of the US and South Korea. 
On the other hand, the growing strength of Japanese domestic anti-North Korean 
sentiment, evidenced by the prominence of the racchi jiken, threatens to reinforce this 
passivity in policy and potential divergence from trilateral policy.  
 
Hence, Japan’s activity in this period strongly diverged from the key principles 
outlined earlier: Japan had moved away from a mix of engagement and containment, 
to largely reliance on the latter; it had cut or endangered its bilateral, trilateral and 
multilateral linkages to engage the North; had allowed itself to be intimidated by the 
North and reacted in such a way that it undermined support for its partners; and came 
close to abdicating its own key support role for engagement policies. The following 
section now outlines how these factors have now come to play in Japanese diplomacy 
towards North Korea since 2001 and will make for potentially even greater 
difficulties. 
 
Japan’s renewed ‘strategy-less’ North Korean strategy from 2001 to 2002 
Japan got back on board the engagement aspects of the trilateral engagement strategy 
from late 2000 onwards, but during the first year of the new Bush administration it 
slipped back into a highly passive style of North Korea policy with regard to 
engagement, and instead concentrated once again on military containment. The Bush 
administration itself, as argued above, was also culpable in failing to take on board the 
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key lessons of North Korean policy, and its reluctance to engage North Korea meant 
that Japan’s policy was further locked into a system of international constraints that 
militated against engagement.  
 
Consequently, Japan during 2001 made few active moves to engage the North and 
acquiesced in a ‘wait and see’ policy in order to divine US policy. However, Japanese 
policy-makers, instead of attempting to use the hiatus in Korean Peninsula 
rapprochement to attempt to prepare some form of domestic consensus that would 
allow it to respond with assurance to the predictable about-turn of US policy and 
loosening of international restrictions upon engagement with the North, devoted most 
of its energies in this period to demonstrating its resolve to meet the North Korean 
security challenge with military power. In October 2001, the Japanese government 
succeeded in passing through the Diet, bundled together with its new anti-terrorism 
law and amendments to the SDF law, a revised law to allow JCG units to fire on 
fushinsen. The JCG was then obliged to utilise these revised laws in the incident 
which led to its sinking of a suspected North Korean vessel, first spotted in Japan’s 
200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and then pursued into China’s 
territorial waters, between 22 and 23 December 2001. Since this incident there has 
been considerable speculation as to why the Japanese government chose to react in 
this particular manner and at this particular time when such North Korean incursions 
are believed to be routine, and to what degree the incident was mishandled at the 
operational level. Nevertheless, the Japanese government demonstrated its clear intent 
of reserving the option to respond with force to further incursions, and, as argued 
below, its subsequent determination to attempt to salvage the wreck of the fushinsen 
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from Chinese territorial waters is representative of the growing hard-line attitude 
towards North Korea in Japan. 
 
Japan’s emphasis on the containment over the engagement aspects of North Korea 
strategy was relatively unproblematic in diplomatic terms as long as the Bush 
administration also maintained a hard-line towards the North, and as long as the North 
responded in kind throughout 2001. Nonetheless, since early 2002, and as noted 
above, the international situation around the Korean Peninsula has shown signs of 
change which once again have exposed the weight of inertia in Japanese policy. 
Japanese policy in early 2002 was thrown into brief confusion by the ‘axis of evil’ 
speech. Japanese policy-makers, even though they were aware that Bush’s address 
was for domestic consumption, were taken aback by the lack of warning and the 
sudden fear that in the aftermath of the apparently successful Afghan campaign the 
US might seriously be contemplating extending its war on terrorism to the Korean 
Peninsula.17 Japanese policy-makers were subsequently reassured of US intentions 
with Bush’s visit to Japan and South Korea in February 2002, but one effect of the 
‘axis of evil’ speech was to demonstrate to the Japanese side how little influence they 
had secured over US actions with regard to North Korea due to their own highly 
passive submission to international constraints and the trilateral framework.  
 
In addition to the problems of lacking a stronger voice in checking US actions with 
regard to North Korea, Japan’s passivity is likely to create further problems in its 
diplomacy as its trilateral partners turn back towards engagement from mid-2002 
onwards. As outlined in the introductory section to this paper, the US and South 
Korea may be edging back towards dialogue and more active engagement of the 
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North and will expect Japan to follow. Japan is indeed attempting to follow this 
trilateral policy line, but it may well be the case that its passivity in previous years and 
the increasing domestic opposition to rapprochement with North Korea will mean that 
it simply cannot follow the US and South Korea and fulfil its role as the essential 
background supporter for trilateral engagement policy. For it is clear that the Japanese 
government’s highlighting of the North Korean security threat and especially the 
increasing domestic demands for a resolution to the racchi jiken may be reaching the 
point whereby even international pressure cannot easily push or persuade Japan back 
into the unified US-South Korea-Japan policy line.  
 
The racchi jiken has now become one of the hottest political potatoes in Japanese 
policy to the point that few influential policy-makers in either MOFA or the LDP are 
willing to handle it directly. MOFA officials and LDP figures involved in making 
North Korea policy and attempting to resolve the abductions issue by working on the 
compromise formula of yukue fumei have been subject to a campaign of public 
criticism. Indeed, this criticism has often reached the level of outright pillory and 
intimidation by a variety of pressure groups working with the families of the alleged 
victims of the racchi jiken, and by influential daily newspapers and weekly magazines 
in Japan with their own axe to grind against North Korea. The racchi jiken have risen 
to a position of such importance in bilateral relations that their resolution has become, 
despite MOFA’s original position in  1991 that there would be no preconditions and 
that all issues would be discussed with a view to a final settlement at the end of talks 
(exit or deguchi), the essential de facto (entrance or  iriguchi) precondition for the 
restart and progress in normalisation negotiations. This change of policy was all but 
admitted by Tanaka Hitoshi, Director General of MOFA’s Asian and Oceanian 
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Affairs Bureau, in a Diet committee session on 18 April 2002.18 North Korea, for its 
part, (perhaps at times unintentionally due to its lack of sensitivity to domestic factors 
in Japan’s diplomacy, but also at other times intentionally using the issue to exert 
pressure on Japan and to split it from its trilateral co-ordination partners) has done 
itself few favours with its reluctance to be at least seen to work with those elements in 
MOFA that are willing to take risks for the normalisation process in order to try to 
move the racchi jiken issue away from being a precondition. Prime Minister Koizumi 
in his pronouncements on relations with North Korea again reiterated that North 
Korean cooperation on the abductions was necessary for the restart of normalisation 
negotiations and met publicly with the relatives of the alleged racchi jiken victims. In 
addition, Koizumi is believed to have sought Chinese assistance on the issue on his 
visit to China in mid-April, and it is also believed that it has been the Prime Minister 
himself who has sought to pursue the North Korean banking scandal to its conclusion. 
Further evidence of the central importance of the racchi jiken issue for any 
improvement in Japan-North Korea bilateral relations was provided with the House of 
Representatives’ passing of a resolution on 11 April 2002 which called for the 
Japanese government to take a tough and proactive stance in investigating the 
whereabouts of the alleged abductees. This coincided with the formation of an all-
party Diet group, initially led by Liberal Party members, which has the intent of 
pressuring the government on the racchi jiken. Hence, the racchi jiken (itself an 
expanding issue with the addition of the Aritomo case to the list of incidents since 
2001; and then media coverage of another possible abductee, Matsuki Kaoru, in late 
April 2002)—in conjunction with a sizeable and growing mountain of other bilateral 
issues including WMD, compensation, Nihonjinzuma, North Korea’s suspected 
involvement in narcotics running to Japan, and demands for the return of the 
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remaining JRA suspects from Pyongyang—have now become an important and 
possibly insurmountable check on any progress in Japan-North Korea relations.  
 
In this situation, it may be near impossible for Japan to stay on board the trilateral 
engagement strategy and it will again abrogate the four policy principles: devoting all 
its energy to containment; failing to maintain its own key bilateral channels with the 
North; allowing itself to be split from its trilateral partners and only encouraging 
North Korean ‘divide and rule’ strategies amongst the US, South Korea and Japan; 
and undermining its own key role and any remaining opportunities to influence the 
overall trajectory and pace of trilateral policy towards North Korea. The outcome is 
that Japan may return to a period of ‘strategy-less’ approaches in its dealing with 
North Korea—fearful of US unilateralism towards North Korea but also unable to 
fully join with a trilateral strategy due to the framework of international and domestic 
restraints and related passivity and limits of influence that it has placed upon itself. 
 
Conclusion: Is there a way out for Japanese diplomacy? 
Japan-North Korea relations as of early 2002 remain stuck in an ever deepening rut as 
the racchi jiken and other unresolved bilateral issues pile up, and this rut may become 
ever more divisive as Japan finds itself unable to break out of the worsening cycle of 
relations and to keep up with renewed US and South Korean engagement efforts. In 
this situation, Japan could become an unwanted and hazardous drag on efforts to 
promote Korean Peninsula stability. Often it is said that North Korea should not be 
backed into a corner, but this is one case where Japan has backed itself into a corner 
with equally unpredictable consequences for Korean Peninsula security co-operation. 
Japan could yet escape from an uncomfortable diplomatic squeeze if the US fails to 
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achieve any progress in relations with the North and to return to talks after a suitable 
intermission following the patrol boat incident, so once again allowing Japan to lapse 
back into passivity in its own bilateral normalisation efforts. But Japan’s position will 
only have further counterproductive effects. Its passivity simply reinforcing US 
reluctance to engage the North, weakening the basis of support also for South Korean 
engagement efforts, and forcing the North into another confrontational stance with the 
regional powers—all the very antithesis of Japan’s own optimum Korean Peninsula 
policy of engagement and stability.  
 
The prospects for Japan being able to extricate itself from this policy rut also appear 
unpromising at present. Japan’s policy-makers have to answer to their domestic 
constituencies; an inconvenience that does not affect North Korea. Moreover, the US 
is often a quixotic ally, that has shown itself capable of chopping and changing policy 
principles (which makes it all the more important that Japan should follow a 
consistent if more proactive line to try to nudge the US back to a true balance of 
containment and engagement efforts). Nevertheless, despite these international and 
domestic difficulties, it is also clear that Japanese policy-makers have managed to tie 
themselves in knots, especially over the racchi jiken issue. MOFA has always had the 
problem of how to incorporate interested LDP politicians into its North Korea 
strategy. On the one hand, these have offered an alternative route for dialogue, but on 
the other they have been interested for reasons of monetary gain and have conducted 
‘individual’ and ‘dual’ diplomacy which has meant them offering North Korea 
concessions beyond those of the precedent of Japan-South Korea normalisation in 
1965. Since 1991, MOFA has tried to wrest control away from the LDP of the 
domestic policy-making process towards North Korea. In certain ways it has 
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succeeded in this and reached an uneasy alliance with key LDP pro-North Korea 
figures. However, it is now the case that both MOFA and the LDP are losing control 
of the policy agenda, and North Korea strategy has been dictated by the racchi jiken, 
pressure groups and the mass media. This has meant that there is no effective 
leadership on North Korea issues within the Japanese policy-making circles, 
especially with regard to engagement strategy. Instead, almost by default, policy 
energy has gone into the remilitarisation of Japanese security policy, predicated in 
many instances on the North Korean threat. Japan’s policy-making indecision over 
North Korea was also demonstrated with the Shengyang consulate incident. The 
Japanese government may have been strictly correct in terms of international law to 
protest at the intrusion into its consulate by Chinese police to recover five North 
Korean defectors. But the fact that the consulate staff appeared at the very least to 
have acquiesced in this intrusion, and that their instructions were to prevent North 
Korean defections, makes the Japanese government appear somewhat inconsistent in 
protesting at the rough treatment of the North Koreans by the Chinese authorities, and 
more concerned with assuming a passive and distant stance with regard to 
humanitarian problems in the North.  
 
Moreover, Japan’s pursuit of its goal to raise the wreckage of the fushinsen represents 
another move in ratcheting up the bilateral tensions between Japan and the North 
Korea. It may be the case that Japan and China came to the conclusion, separately or 
in their discussions in April and June that there is nothing on board the vessel, or that 
nothing will be found to connect any third state with the incident. This is despite the 
fact that there have long been suspicions that North Korean fushinsen routinely 
receive refuel at Chinese ports or in Chinese waters before entering Japan’s territorial 
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waters.19 Hence, the only incriminating evidence found so far is that to connect the 
ship with North Korea, including a variety of heavy weapons. Japan’s refusal to let 
matters rest in this incident may lead to further discoveries that only send relations 
with North Korea plunging further into the negative.  
 
Japanese policy is thus strategy-less, leaderless and one-dimensional towards North 
Korea. It may yet be the case that the US and South Korea can exert sufficient 
pressure on Japan to give it the momentum to overcome domestic opposition to 
moving forward with engagement policies. But this is something which cannot be 
relied upon without causing ruptures in the trilateral framework of diplomacy, or, 
indeed, of happening at all as long as the racchi jiken remain the precondition for 
normalisation negotiations and the North Korea question the poisoned chalice of all 
Japanese policy-makers.  
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